Decision To Use The Atomic Bomb And The Architecture Of An American Myth, The

Decision To Use The Atomic Bomb And The Architecture Of An American Myth, The

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Book - 1995
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Baker & Taylor
Stating that the United States did not have to use the atomic bomb in order to win the war, a detailed study profiles a defeated Japan while citing the influences of such figures as Dwight Eisenhower and James F. Byrnes on the decision. 50,000 first printing. Tour.

Book News
Alperovitz (president, Center for Economic Alternatives) examines the fateful decision of August 1945 and concludes that the US did not need to deploy the atomic bomb to win the war. He shows that Japan was close to surrender and reveals that Truman was advised of alternatives to the bomb by civilian and military advisors, pinning partial blame on incoming secretary of state James F. Byrnes, who was convinced the bomb would be an important diplomatic instrument in dealing with the Soviets. For general readers. Annotation copyright Book News, Inc. Portland, Or.

Blackwell North Amer
One of the most controversial issues absorbing America today: Was it necessary to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Fifty years after the fateful summer of 1945, we are still debating Harry Truman's decision.
Now, in an exhaustive, thoroughly documented study of the events of that time, Gar Alperovitz makes plain why the United States did not need to deploy the bomb, how Truman was advised of alternatives to it by nearly every civilian and military adviser, and how his final decision was later justified by what amounted to a deception - the claim that the action saved half a million to a million American soldiers who might otherwise have died in an invasion.
Alperovitz demonstrates that Japan was close to surrender, that it was profoundly threatened by the prospect of Soviet entry into the war, and that American leaders knew the end was near. Military commanders like Eisenhower, Arnold, and Leahy saw no need to use the bomb; most of Truman's key Cabinet members urged a clarification of the position of Japan's Emperor to speed surrender. But the inexperienced president listened most intently to his incoming secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, and Byrnes was convinced the bomb would be an important diplomatic instrument in dealing with the Soviets.

Publisher: New York: Knopf 1995
Edition: 1st ed
ISBN: 9780679443315
0679443312
Characteristics: xiv, 847 p.
Additional Contributors: Tree, Sanho

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